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INTERTWINED COORDINATION MECHANISMS IN 
INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH 
DOMINATED SUPPLIERS 
 
Abstract 
Contemporary business society shows many examples of industrial customers that manage their smaller, 
dependent suppliers by using bureaucratic mechanisms. The restrictions these control processes put on the 
suppliers‟ freedom to act have not been recognized in most studies within the field. The purpose of this article 
is to provide an understanding of how bureaucratic mechanisms interrelate with social mechanisms in 
coordinating interorganizational processes where the customer has a dominating role in the market. The article 
is based on observations with complementary interviews of relationships between an industrial customer and 
two of its suppliers. 
 
Dominated suppliers in power-based business relations may see the role of bureaucratic mechanisms as 
primarily protecting the relationship. A strong argument for interorganizational coordination lies in the need for 
different capabilities to manage dissimilar activities. However, if the dominated actors prioritize protecting the 
relationship over striving for efficiency, the dominating organization will be alone in deciding on the agenda 
for interorganizational control. Social coordination mechanisms may to some extent create flexibility in rigid 
bureaucratic control mechanisms. However, although social mechanisms may have the potential to enable 
bureaucratic mechanisms to be shunned temporarily, they are less helpful in changing the agenda of 
bureaucratic control. Further research is suggested on how local concerns can be included in dominating actors‟ 
process of setting agendas for interorganizational control.  
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dominated supplier.  
 
  
INTRODUCTION  
Coordination processes between companies have attracted much attention in recent years, especially 
from customers engaged in controlling their suppliers to establish supply chains. The general idea is to manage 
the exchange with external suppliers as if they were a part of the company (Christopher, 1998; Chopra & 
Meidl, 2001). This implies more information sharing between companies than in the traditional market model, 
i.e. the use of both bureaucratic and social coordination mechanisms within a market setting.  
This field has been considered of interest for management accounting and control (Shields, 1997; 
Hopwood, 1996; Scapens & Bromwich, 2001; Otley, 1994; Tomkins, 2001). Earlier studies on 
interorganizational relationships have shown that management control techniques can be used in 
interorganizational settings (Mouritsen et al, 2001; Carr & Ng, 1995; Dekker, 2004; Cooper & Slagmulder, 
2004) and Dekker (2003, p. 20) states that management control in his case contributes to “… improved supply 
chain performance”. 
Empirical studies of accounting in interorganizational control have often had the perspective of the 
dominating partner (Carr & Ng, 1995; Frances & Garnsey, 1996; Dekker, 2003; Seal et al, 2004) or have 
studied situations where the partners are fairly equal (Håkansson & Lind, 2004; Dekker, 2004; Mouritsen & 
Thrane, 2006; Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004). However, there seems to be a lack of studies on 
interorganizational relationships that acknowledge the situation of the dominated partner in a relationship. A 
dominant customer who intends to manage their suppliers could regard the situation as similar to the managing 
of an internal unit, especially if dominated suppliers accept and act accordingly. However, to a dominated 
supplier, with objectives of their own, the control activities are seen within a different context, i.e. a complexity 
in balancing demands from different customers and from owners (or other stakeholders important to the 
specific organization). Interorganizational control may have implications for intra-organizational processes 
(Mouritsen et al, 2001; Håkansson & Lind, 2004) and within the supply chain management-literature, it has 
been noted that customers controlling suppliers may restrict the supply chain efficiency, in contrast to their 
intention (see short review in Harland, 1996). Seal et al (1999) state that supplying organizations in general 
have often been neglected in studies of interorganizational relationships. “Although paying lip service to the 
interests of the supplier, much of the literature looks at cost management through the eyes of the purchaser”, 
the authors (op.cit. p. 310) add. It seems therefore worthwhile to broaden the scope of experience in accounting 
research by acknowledging the context and internal circumstances of dominated suppliers when studying 
interorganizational control.  
  
Ouchi‟s (1979) coordination mechanisms are used to inform this study. Ouchi (1979) sees market, 
bureaucracy and informal social mechanisms as generic notions that interrelate in the coordination of actions. 
In this article, the interrelation between these mechanisms will be explored in an interorganizational setting, as 
has been suggested by Håkansson & Lind (2004) and Mouritsen & Thrane (2006). While coordination of 
intraorganizational relationships is done inside the formal structure of a hierarchy, interorganizational 
relationships are coordinated within the power-structure in a market. It is here suggested that this shift in 
background to coordination is relevant to the function of and interrelation between the coordination 
mechanisms. Bureaucratic mechanisms have been developed for hierarchies, where actors are accountable for 
their actions to a manager (Otley, 1994). Ouchi (1979) argues that employees accept that they are accountable 
because they are paid to be just that. Suppliers may also see bureaucratic mechanisms as a part of the business 
contract. However, suppliers must on a daily basis balance the implications of bureaucratic mechanisms within 
one contract with demands from other stakeholders (primarily owners and other customers). In this way, the 
interorganizational setting implies a different context for bureaucratic mechanisms than bureaucracies. 
Bureaucratic mechanisms never work in isolation, and especially not in an interorganizational context. To 
understand the role of bureaucratic mechanisms, they should be studied within the context they are used in 
(Roberts & Scapens, 1985).  
The purpose of this article is to provide an understanding of the role of bureaucratic mechanisms and 
how they interrelate with social mechanisms in coordinating interorganizational processes where the buying 
partner has a dominating role in the market. Two interorganizational relationships between one assembler and 
two of its suppliers are studied with specific interest in how the suppliers handle the attempts by the assembler 
to impose bureaucratic control. The assembler is much larger than its suppliers and the suppliers act in a market 
under cost-pressure with the assembler as a highly important customer.  
It is worthwhile commenting on the use of Ouchi‟s (1979) mechanisms of governance to analyze 
coordination processes. Ouchi‟s work has been further developed as a part of the widely used transaction cost 
theory, which tries to explain under what circumstances different coordination mechanisms could be expected 
to dominate the control pattern (Williamson, 1991; Ouchi, 1980)
1
. However, in this article the focus is on how 
the three coordination mechanisms operate in relation to each other in a certain setting, i.e. a focus on the 
process of interaction and how the coordination mechanisms work (Mouritsen and Thrane, 2006). Different 
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  This line of research has been pursued in articles concerning interorganizational relations (van der 
Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003)  
 
  
authors (Ouchi, 1979; 1980; Williamson, 1991; Håkansson & Lind, 2004) have recognized that the three 
mechanisms of governance co-exist within organizations and that it is hard to find „pure‟ organizational forms 
of market, bureaucracy or clan. As Ouchi (1979, p. 834) points out, “Although it might be helpful to treat them 
as conceptually distinct from each other, they in fact occur overlapping”. Håkansson & Lind (2004, p. 68) 
identify hierarchical, market and cooperative coordination within the same interorganizational relationship and 
also suggest that there “might be good reasons to study how the forms of organizations can be combined” (see 
also Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006). 
The next section discusses Ouchi‟s (1979) coordination mechanisms with respect to their relevance to 
this study, in the light of which research questions are drawn. The empirical setting and some methodological 
reflections are provided before the case study is presented and interpreted. Conclusions and theoretical 
contributions wrap up the article. 
 
COORDINATION IN INTERORGANIZATIONAL SETTINGS  
 
Ouchi (1979) is widely recognized for the suggestion of three generic coordination mechanisms: (1) 
market, (2) bureaucratic mechanisms and (3) social mechanisms. The potential role of these three coordination 
mechanisms in interorganizational settings will be outlined in the following, together with ideas for how they 
may interrelate. 
 
Market mechanism 
Market mechanism coordinates transactions since actors are autonomous and have the right to choose 
with which actor to carry through a transaction, with price as the principal carrier of information. The use of a 
pure market mechanism does not correspond with an interorganizational relationship, since the 
interorganizational relationship implies a continued interaction between two specific parties and the additional 
information than can be fitted into the price. Richardson (1972) provides an explanation of why economic 
rational actors may want to establish interorganizational relationships. He suggests that activities which are 
closely complementary however dissimilar may be organized in co-operation by organizations. Their 
dissimilarity means that different capabilities are needed to manage them, which may be found in different 
organizations. At the same time, the fact that activities are closely complementary to each other means that they 
cannot be coordinated through the market, since the price mechanism cannot include all the information needed 
  
(see also Håkansson & Lind, 2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). Additional information is often required 
both to enable the “mastery of events” and to “create trust and check on the state of the relationship” (Tomkins, 
2001, p. 171; see also Dekker‟s (2004, p. 27), “coordination of tasks” and “management of appropriation 
concern”. The cooperation between companies should enable them to create a higher value in their exchange, 
which they can share (Dekker, 2003). 
With interorganizational relationships, market mechanism is to some extent restricted. However, it is 
still of high relevance to the coordination process. Firstly, and most obviously, market mechanism acts as a 
threat to a relationship, a threat that has to be avoided in negotiations for new contracts or when changes within 
a relationship are discussed. Secondly, market mechanism can also influence the coordination process through 
a more subtle mode. Actors may be influenced by the market setting that the interorganizational relationships 
are embedded in without openly referring to their role in the relationship as reason for action.  
How market mechanism influences an interorganizational relationship could be expected to be related to 
the market setting and the power-relations between the actors. For example, the market setting would be 
expected to affect the dividing of the jointly created value in the interorganizational relationship (Porter 1985). 
In a case study of supermarkets and suppliers in the UK, Frances & Garnsey (1996, p. 603) suggest that the 
presence of the global market can be used “… to put pressure on local suppliers. Global producers can provide 
substitutes for local producers who are not meeting the supermarkets requirements”. Referring to the 
alternatives and price-cuts on the market, they can claim a major part of the jointly created value by demanding 
a lower price. Frances & Garnsey (1996, p. 603) say that this situation has enabled their dominating 
organization to ”… represent themselves as price takers on the global market, divesting themselves of 
responsibility for price-setting”, i.e. customers may claim that they have to put pressure on the suppliers‟ 
margins to protect competitiveness in the market for the supply chain.  
Organizations risk losing investments made in a relationship due to asset specificity. For example, 
Baiman & Rajan (2002) show how an increased information exchange enables actors to misappropriate 
information. Dominated suppliers may face a risk of losing investments made in the relationship if the 
dominating actor chooses to use its market position and turn elsewhere. The main part of (managerialist) 
literature views trust as the key issue in this situation (Bachman, 2001; Seal et al, 2004). In the area of 
accounting in interorganizational control, Dekker (2003) and Carr & Ng (1995) redirect attention to the 
possibility of trust as an important element to avoid cooperation being restricted by fear of dominating actors 
misappropriating their position within the relationship. For example, Dekker (2003) discusses pricing for 
  
businesses within interorganizational relationships between profit-driven organizations. He claims that 
dominated actors need to trust that profits will be distributed fairly in order to involve themselves in 
interorganizational control. Dekker (2003) and Carr & Ng (1995) suggest that dominating customers consider 
their reputation in the market, and thereby refrain from taking short-term advantage of their position.  
Bachmann (2001) and Seal et al (2004) question the actors‟ sole reliance on trust to engage in 
interorganizational relationships and in the process exposing themselves to risks of losing relation-specific 
investments. A dominated actor in a market where there are few alternative customers to approach might 
engage in interorganizational control despite the lack of trust. Asset specific investment can be made and 
information may be exchanged because the dominating actor requires this in order to establish or continue the 
interorganizational relationship. The dominating actor has the power to enforce interorganizational 
relationships, since the dominated actor is interested in keeping the business. Bachmann (2001, p 350) writes, 
“Trust works on the basis of positive assumptions about alter ego’s willingness and ability to co-operate, while 
power is constitutively based on the selection of a negative hypothetical possibility regarding alter ego’s (re-
)actions“. Both power and trust can enable dominated actors to know what to expect from their business 
partner. Based on these expectations they can choose whether to be in a relationship or not. Seal et al (2004) 
show that power, established by the market setting, can be seen as enabling interorganizational relationships. 
Their dominant actor takes on a managerial role in the supply chain based on power in their relationship with 
some of their small and local suppliers.  
Power and trust are both worth exploring with respect to their potential to enable an interorganizational 
relationship. Trust may be preferred due to actors‟ unrestricted will to engage in cooperative and efficiency-
seeking activities. Power-based relationship will be characterized by dominated actors doing what they need to 
do in order to keep the relationship. However, a power-based relationship may also enable dominated actors to 
gain knowledge and competitiveness.  
The disadvantage of trust is that it is a more fragile base for a relationship than power (Mouritsen & 
Thrane, 2006; Bachmann, 2001). Mouritsen & Thrane (2006, p. 243) argue that the influence of trust has to be 
studied more critically when they discuss it as a moral obligation as “… people have to trust each other”. Since 
trust is presumed, any lack of trust will be a problematising device. If a dominated supplier starts to suspect that 
a customer uses information for other purposes than they officially state, trust may be lost and the relationship 
will be in a crisis. With a power-based relationship, the supplier may from the beginning expect information 
given to the customer to be used for both cost-pressure and the seeking of efficiency-gains. The advantage of a 
  
power-based relationship would be that there is no trust to be lost
2
. This difference points at the importance of 
understanding what constitutes the base for a relationship (Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006). Trust and power could 
both be expected to be a part of every relationship, and need to be considered in order to understand 
interorganizational relationships. 
To understand market mechanism influence on interorganizational relationships, it is important to study 
both the overall market setting, that is the alternatives for the actors involved, and the power/trust dimension 
within the relationship, i.e. what the dominant and dominated actors expect from each other or to what extent 
they allow themselves to act opportunistically. Few studies have recognized the situation of dominated 
organizations in power-based interorganizational relationships. The case study presented in the empirical part 
of this article enables us to explore the overarching research question of how the bureaucratic and social 
coordination mechanisms act upon and interact in an interorganizational relationship with power as the main 
force in creating expectancies between actors. This research question will be further specified at the end of this 
literature review. 
 
Bureaucratic mechanisms 
According to Ouchi (1979), the rules that bureaucratic mechanisms are based upon are mostly standards 
to which managed actors should conform. The standards concern either how activities should be carried out or 
the outcome of the activities. Coordination of interorganizational relationships is often of a horizontal type, 
with focus on how activities should be performed to enhance the flow of products between organizations. In 
earlier studies of management accounting and control in interorganizational relationships, where one of the 
parties is dominating the relationship, it has been evident that the stronger actor decides the agenda for the 
interorganizational relationship (Dekker, 2003; Carr & Ng, 1995; Seal et al, 2004); thereby deciding which 
kind of bureaucratic control should be employed.  
Two main categories of arguments in the literature motivate this research for a managerial role in a 
supply chain. One is to help suppliers search for efficiency and the other is to exert cost pressure on suppliers. 
Munday (1992) explores the presence of open-book accounting in 27 UK companies. The majority of 
customers required cost-data and 21 of the suppliers experienced cost-pressure as a motive for information 
sharing. However, the suppliers responded that they also received different kinds of feedback about suggestions 
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  Power can also be lost due to changes in the market or that dominated actors stop fearing sanctions 
from dominant actors. However, Bachmann (2001) states that the loss of power probably would not harm a 
relationship as hard as the loss of trust. Trust has more emotional weight attached to it. 
  
for cost-reductions. Case studies in accounting also show support for the dominating customer having either or 
both of these two reasons as motives to try to manage interorganizational relationships (Dekker, 2003; Carr & 
Ng, 1995; Seal et al, 2004; Frances & Garnsey, 1996). 
Search for efficiency in a supply chain can be seen when two business partners consider each other‟s 
situation and search for the best solution to their joint performance. However, earlier studies on 
interorganizational control with one dominating partner have focused mainly on the direct interaction between 
organizations (for example Seal et al, 2004, and Dekker, 2003). In supply chain literature, there has been a 
strong emphasis on coordinating the whole chain as one single company, assuming that the company‟s own 
efforts to attain the highest possible profitability are best carried out by adopting administrative rules for their 
business relationships to enhance efficiency (Christopher, 1998; Chopra & Meidl, 2001). Focusing on the 
exchange process within a relationship is narrower than considering the involved organizations and their 
business context. Furthermore, the studies of Dekker (2003) and Carr & Ng (1995) are carried out from the 
perspective of the dominating partner. The influence of initiatives the dominating partner suggests on internal 
operations of a dominated supplier and second-tier suppliers or other business relationships are not analyzed in 
depth. Ford et al (1998) argue that this is a potential source of uncertainty about efficiency. In analyzing one 
interorganizational relationship, it can be expected that this relationship will have some kind of implication for 
other business relations which the actors have. Ford et al (1998, p. 13) state that “… whenever we examine a 
single buyer-seller relationship we must be aware of how it is intertwined with others held by both the buyer 
and the seller in a wider network”.  
Dominating customers may also manage relationships in order to enable cost-pressure. Frances & 
Garnsey (1996) maintain that a dominating buyer may search for information about cost structure and 
operational information to enable this cost pressure. The argument for information about cost structure is that 
since customers and suppliers often are interdependent in the short run, the former want low prices but not 
lower than what enable the latter to continue with deliveries. This may be achieved through tracking the cost 
structure and margin of profit of suppliers. Operational information, on the other hand, is supposed to reduce 
the interdependence. Frances & Garnsey (1996) say that a dominant buyer may partly be motivated to get 
involved in the operations in order to gain knowledge about the supplier. This may facilitate the buyer to turn 
elsewhere for business without substantial loss of knowledge. The cost of engaging in the suppliers‟ operation 
is partly motivated by this knowledge, (beside the intention to help the dominated actor and increase efficiency 
in the supply chain).  
  
A dominating customer is therefore enforcing a strongly bureaucratic approach to management which, 
according to Vosselman (2002, p. 135), can be described as a situation where, “The emphasis will be on pre-
action reviews and action accountability controls using detailed qualitative and quantitative information”. This 
is rather different from the role of traditional, financial accounting, which often attempts “… to consider the 
organization function by function in a hierarchical manner” (Otley, 1994, p. 294). The advantage of the 
traditional role of financial accounting is that it is simple. If performance can be captured in a single measure of 
return on investments, then there is a possibility to manage with a low amount of information processing 
(Merchant & Stede, 2003). This approach has been accused of being too concerned about the vertical 
perspective, i.e. evaluating unit by unit management for internal efficiency and failing to recognize the 
horizontal processes and need for coordination between them (Otley, 1994). However, we should bear in mind 
that a horizontal focus adds complexity and in consequence costs to the managing process. Considerable 
attention has been paid to the vertical perspective in management accounting during the last twenty years. 
Proponents of methods like the balanced scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 1996), target costing (Tani et al, 1994) 
and activity based costing (Cooper & Kaplan, 1998) all have the common denominator aimed at broadening the 
scope of management accounting. This would be a step closer to the more strongly bureaucratic approach in 
terms of Vosselman (2002), requiring additional information processing in the managing of the organization. 
Jones (1999, p. 184) writes, “The availability of efficient reliable information is as necessary for 
network as for hierarchical functioning” and when dominating organizations seek a strongly bureaucratic 
approach to management, there will be tough demands on information systems. However, traditional 
accounting systems, which often are assumed to have a role in providing information for interorganizational 
control, have often been considered to be unsuitable for the purpose of managing interorganizational settings. 
According to Gietzman (1996, p. 613), “Traditional management accounting practices do not provide managers 
with necessary information to assess whether or how to work…” in interorganizational relationships. Gietzman 
(1996) focuses on the costs involved in not turning to the supplier with the lowest cost. He also raises the 
question of costs for suppliers in adjusting to customers.  
So far, the role of bureaucratic mechanisms has been outlined as a tool supporting the management of an 
existing relationship. Mouritsen & Thrane (2006), based on the actor-network-theory, suggest another 
perspective. They propose that bureaucratic mechanisms are an active part of the ongoing activities within a 
network through which interactions between other actors can be understood. Rules about sharing of 
information and evaluation of performance may regulate how one actor perceives another. The attribution of 
  
meaning to bureaucratic mechanisms by one actor may have implications for another actor. Mouritsen & 
Thrane (2006, p. 242) search for, “… how accounting is a „force‟ – an actor – in establishing and developing 
inter-organizational relationships”, and propose that accounting techniques may be seen as an actor who is 
decisive to the interaction between other actors. Bureaucratic mechanisms that are introduced by dominating 
organizations are likely to be interpreted by the dominated parts concerning their potential meaning to the 
relationship. This has a bearing on both the processes that are initiated by working with the bureaucratic 
mechanisms that are introduced, and the processes of trying to change or chose to disregard them. Mouritsen & 
Thrane (2006) claim that accounting can be seen as decisive regarding who is inside a network and who is not. 
To reject accounting can be to reject a relationship. This claim will be shown as important for a setting where a 
dominated actor tries to protect a position within a relationship. 
To summarize, dominating customers often seek to engage in interorganizational control that requires 
in-depth information about multiple organizations, which may not always be available in contemporary 
accounting systems. It appears to be a highly complex task that a dominant actor seeks to perform. This 
functional reasoning about complexity may point at an incentive for organizations to avoid, or reduce 
interorganizational control. However, bureaucratic mechanisms viewed as active in upholding a relationship 
open a perspective that makes it possible to see bureaucratic mechanisms as something more than supporting 
cost-pressure or search for efficiency. For example, to disregard bureaucratic mechanisms is no longer just to 
miss out on a possible improvement of performance; to disregard bureaucratic mechanisms is either to request a 
„renegotiation‟ of the relationship in itself or to leave the relationship. More light is to be shed on the role of 
these different perspectives on bureaucratic mechanisms in coordination with power-based interorganizational 
relationships in the following sections. 
 
Social, informal mechanisms 
Informal, social coordination mechanism occurs when managers trust individuals to take responsibility 
to carry out the tasks that are assigned to them (Ouchi, 1979). Numerous accounting studies paying attention to 
the coordination processes find that informal, social coordination may have an important role in „getting things 
done‟. Jönsson & Grönlund (1988) show how people take responsibility and are willing to account for others 
with whom they interact, actively seeking information in order to solve the task at hand. Information systems 
on operative levels are in the authors‟ case study informal and adjusted to the situation at hand. From an 
interorganizational setting, Håkansson & Lind (2004, p. 63) notice that people from different organizations “… 
  
together develop a strategy to create the greatest impact on the technical units” within one of the organizations. 
Hedberg et al (1994), who studied virtual organizations, hold that information exchange is often informally 
made in such organizations. Generally, discussions about lateral accountability (Willmott, 1996) imply that 
people often do take responsibility for their action and have obligations toward others, with or without formal 
enforcement of this behavior.  
Donada & Nogatchewsky‟s (2006) is one of the few articles explicitly recognizing the interaction 
between coordination mechanisms in interorganizational relationships. Donada & Nogatchewsky (2006, p. 284) 
conclude that socially based control is “…exerted at the operational level in response to operational needs for 
flexibility and adaptability” in a relationship mainly characterized by market-based control where all three 
coordination mechanisms are evident. The conclusion is interesting as it signals a role for informal, social 
mechanisms in a power-based relationship. A relationship between two organizations often includes many 
connections between individuals and processes (Håkansson & Lind, 2004), which need to be studied to 
understand coordination. Donada & Nogatchewsky (2006) stress that different persons within the involved 
organizations perform different types of control (purchasers relying on market power when operative managers 
moderate this by relying on social, informal coordination). The possibilities for social coordination mechanisms 
to enable flexibility in coordination processes will be further explored in this article. 
 
Focus of the study 
The first research question to be explored in this article is how dominated suppliers may interpret 
bureaucratic mechanisms in an interorganizational relationship, with power as the main force in creating 
expectancy between actors. A relationship based on power may add complexity to the process of 
interorganizational control. In a trust-based relationship, actors assume that information can be exchanged 
openly without harming the relationship. In a power-based relationship, where there are negative expectations 
about the consequences of the dominant actor‟s action, dominated actors may not be willing to share 
information or the dominant actor may disregard the actions they take. The market mechanism may be 
recognized by dominated actors as a reason to avoid disturbing the dominant actor by raising questions. This 
may enable a dominant actor to enforce bureaucratic control upon an interorganizational relationship. 
Furthermore, with accounting as a basis for constituting a relationship which dominated actors want to 
preserve, bureaucratic mechanisms may be experienced as positive in the sense of deepening a relationship, 
rather than enhancing the efficiency of exchange. Thus, the role of the bureaucratic mechanism may be seen 
  
differently by dominant and dominated actors in an interorganizational relationship. Dominating actors may see 
the mechanisms employed as mainly a way to achieve efficiency and exert cost-pressure, while dominated 
actors may see the mechanisms as mainly a way to preserve the relationship.  
The second research question is how social coordination mechanisms may give flexibility to an 
interorganizational relationship where a dominating customer enforces strong bureaucratic coordination. The 
very complex setting for bureaucratic mechanisms, together with the potential difference in expectations of 
bureaucratic mechanism by the different actors, creates a situation where flexibility outside bureaucratic 
mechanisms is needed „to get things done‟. At the same time, a market situation with one dominating 
organization may to some extent collide with the need for actors to collaborate. An interorganizational 
relationship with a dominating organization may create a dilemma for actors belonging to dominated 
organizations. Actors in dominated organizations may see advantages in acting in a straightforward manner by 
bringing problems to the dominating actors‟ attention and working towards change. However, they may also 
see advantages in not interfering with dominating actors‟ ideas about how to manage relationships. An 
intriguing aspect of this research question is the extent to which social coordination mechanisms are allowed to 
have a role in a relationship where one organization has the possibility to draw on power, and that organization 
enforces bureaucratic coordination mechanisms upon the relationship.  
 A qualitative case study of two interorganizational relationships will be used to develop our 
understanding of these research questions. Two aspects stand out as extra important in order to be able to grasp 
coordination in this complex setting. Firstly, as mentioned in the beginning, the processes of coordination are in 
focus in this study. To study how certain activities are coordinated as isolated events would probably not 
uncover how coordination mechanisms interact. To trace how actors see that a relationship has developed over 
time, and how earlier actions are seen as important for the actions coming, should improve the possibilities to 
understand how coordination mechanisms interact. Secondly, coordination between two organizations that are 
in a somewhat complicated exchange process is bound to involve many actors and require a number of 
different types of activities to be coordinated. To study everything in a relationship is probably impossible, but 
to follow how a certain action is related to other actions by different actors should improve the possibility to 
present a coherent interpretation of a coordination process between two organizations.  
The next section starts with an in-depth overview of the setting of the case, followed by methodological 
considerations regarding the case study. Thereafter the case material is presented and interpreted. At first, the 
potential cost of interorganizational control, as perceived by the dominated suppliers, is discussed. This is to 
  
show how suppliers develop arguments to question some of the control initiatives taken by the dominating 
customer. These arguments are not always brought to the attention of the customer, and the following section 
displays an interpretation of why the suppliers accept control initiatives which they do not see as contributing 
to efficiency in the way that is proposed by the customer. The empirical section ends by an exploration of how 
the social and informal mechanisms‟ interrelate with bureaucratic control and the market setting. 
 
CASE STUDY OF TWO INTEROGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Three companies have been studied - a manufacturing company (here called The Customer) and two of 
the Customer‟s suppliers (called Supplier 1 and Supplier 2). The Customer is a producing unit with 3000 
employees within a large, multinational corporation. The Customer supplies assembling units with technically 
advanced and complex products, mainly within the same corporation. The corporation acts in a highly 
competitive market, where new models of products are offered on the market every year and with an ongoing 
search for efficiency gains. The industry has been under cost-pressure for a long time, and massive efficiency 
improvements have been made during the last twenty years. The Customer, as with many other actors in the 
industry, has tried or has been working with different management models like JIT, TQM and outsourcing. At 
the time of the study, there was an ongoing search for capital rationalization within the whole corporation. The 
interviewees from The Customer considered it hard to get approval for new investments and there was a 
constant search for possibilities to reduce stock and time in different processes. 
Supplier 1 & Supplier 2 are, in comparison, small organizations with approximately 100 employees 
each. They are both part of larger corporations (although not as large as the corporation The Customer belongs 
to), but run their businesses independently as far as operations are concerned. The percentage of production 
allocated to The Customer‟s products is 50% for Supplier 1 and 30% for Supplier 2. They are both under 
financial pressure from their corporations. Besides The Customer, Supplier 1 has two other customers and 
Supplier 2 has five (see figure 1 for an overview of business relationships). The number of customers has 
decreased over the last years, mainly as the number of actors on the market in general has fallen.  
 
In the short run, Supplier 1 and Supplier 2 are considered important suppliers to The Customer, each 
supplying 20-30 products that are critical and customized. Most of the products are used on a daily basis by 
The Customer, implying that there is constant interaction on the operative level within the relationships. 
However, The Customer‟s representatives consider Supplier 1 and Supplier 2 replaceable. Their skills are not 
  
considered unique in the long run. There are other actors, some of them within the geographical range of The 
Customer and others in Eastern Europe that could do what Supplier 1 and Supplier 2 are doing. The suppliers 
express concern for the possible loss of The Customer. The loss means huge volumes of surplus production, as 
they see no other actors on the market that could fill the demand for their products. Their other customers are 
not expected to increase their purchases and there are worries of a general over-capacity in the industry.  
Seeing The Customer as the dominating part of the studied relationships is supported by the market 
setting. The fact that The Customer dominates can also be understood from the observations and interviews 
outlined in the following case description.  
 
The Study 
The empirical study of the two interorganizational relationships between The Customer and its two 
suppliers is mainly done through the lens of observations of a logistical change project aimed at outsourcing 
both The Customer‟s stock and the planning of deliveries within the exchange called Vendor Managed 
Inventory, [VMI
3
]. As mentioned, The Customer is in an industry where cost pressure is tough and new 
methods for increasing cost-efficiency are constantly put forward. VMI is one of these new methods. However, 
since The Customer has more than 200 suppliers, any general change in the interface towards suppliers, as VMI 
is supposed to be, demands a high degree of preparation and analysis. Therefore, senior management in The 
Customer decide to carry through a pilot-study, testing the VMI-method with two of their suppliers, Supplier 1 
and Supplier 2. These suppliers are chosen because The Customer is important to them, and they are expected 
to cooperate. Furthermore, these two suppliers have good reputation with The Customer, which at the time of 
the study showed good ratings in quality and delivery precision. They are also considered to have many 
progressive ideas.  
Taking part in the study are managers of logistics and logistics assistants (in charge of deliveries) from 
the two suppliers. A logistics developer from The Customer is in charge of the project and also the initiator of 
the project, together with his boss, the logistics manager from The Customer. However, the logistics manager 
from The Customer does not take part in the project meetings (see figure 1).  
                                                 
3
  VMI is supposed to reduce employed capital and create possibilities to reduce costs throughout the 
supply chain. This implies moving responsibility for ordering and size of deliveries from The Customer to the 
suppliers. Inside a general agreement, the suppliers will be given full information about The Customer‟s need 
of products for production, in order for the suppliers to decide themselves when to deliver. The Customer 
should thereby be able to reduce costs by 1) reducing the number of people working with procurement and by 
2) reducing stock. The suppliers shall through VMI have better information and thereby be able to enhance 
planning. The total level of stock and cycle time between suppliers and The Customer shall thereby be reduced, 
and so will the costs.  
  
 
*** Insert figure 1 here *** 
 
Method 
As a researcher I was given full access to the pilot-study, which offered a good insight into the 
relationships between The Customer and its suppliers. Since VMI was supposed to change the relationship 
between the companies both operatively and financially, the pilot-study included an in-depth analysis of the 
exchange regarding both strategic and operative aspects. As a researcher, this opportunity gave me the chance 
to gather the views of the members of the project on the coordination between the involved actors, both 
regarding organizations and individuals, as well as formal and informal aspects. 
The case study has a qualitative, interpretative approach to research. Even if costs and efficiency are 
much in focus, it is the respondents‟ perceptions of these notions and how these and other perceptions become 
meaningful in the coordination processes that are interpreted. The contributions of this article are theoretically 
informed experiences, that are supposed to support the interpretation of and thereby action in other situations 
(Jönsson & Macintosh, 1997). The role of the case study is to enable the theorizing of how things can be seen, 
and while doing so, new aspects are introduced to the theoretical world or added to our register of empirical 
examples. It is impossible to guarantee that all relevant aspects of the case have been seen and interpreted in the 
most relevant way. What we can do as researchers is to put together a coherent story out of the observations 
and stories we hear. If a case is trustworthy, this can be signalized through the logic of the story, how the 
different aspects of a case study interrelate and together create an interesting understanding about the studied 
question (Mouritsen, 1999). 
The study aims at understanding an ongoing coordination process, for which observation has been 
suggested as a suitable method for data gathering (Kvale, 1996). The empirical data for the study include six 
days of observing meetings and an internal project review meeting at The Customer. Since the companies are 
located approximately 200 kilometers from each other, meetings were condensed into a few days. My role in 
these meetings was as a passive observer. Therefore, I could concentrate on taking notes.  
During the observations, many leads to interesting themes came up but were not discussed to the extent 
that I needed for my study. This is a common problem with data gathering observations, since the researcher 
has limited possibilities to influence the observed process. Interviews were used to give a more in-depth 
interpretation of the meetings. I interviewed both logistics managers and the logistics assistants from the 
  
suppliers and the logistics developer from The Customer. Besides the exploration of the themes which I found 
interesting for my study, I had the opportunity to talk in private to the respondents. Additional information has 
been sought from the documentation of the pilot study and informal contacts with the participants, for example 
when travelling by car together to the meetings, during breaks and through contacts via e-mail and phone.  
 
Perceived costs for the suppliers of bureaucratic, interorganizational control  
The Customer had for a number of years implemented new control methods that were supposed to 
enhance efficiency in the supply chains. They continuously evaluated their suppliers concerning quality and 
delivery precision. The suppliers were ranked according to these measures, and the variances that seemed to 
recur were investigated by The Customer. The Customer was also engaged directly in the operations of their 
suppliers. For example, engineers from The Customer had on some occasions been working in the plant of 
Supplier 1 for a number of weeks, trying to fix problems which had been detected by The Customer. There 
were many indications that The Customer had assumed a managing role in the supply chain, supporting with 
expertise and demanding different kinds of actions to ensure overall quality. The following looks into the 
suppliers‟ view that the exchange process created additional costs and inefficiency.  
 
Cost of lost flexibility 
The first example shows how the suppliers regard the bureaucratic mechanisms suggested by The 
Customer as restricting flexibility. One of the activities directly managed by The Customer is transportation 
from suppliers‟ plants. The Customer decides on when trucks should pick up the products from Supplier 2. The 
Logistics Manager of Supplier 2 sees problems with this: 
 
“We have been forced to deliver at eight in the morning most of the time. Then everything must be ready 
the day before. The delivery need not reach The Customer until much later, but when the truck leaves, it 
leaves. If we are not ready, we will have to buy the service ourselves on short notice, and that is 
expensive” [Logistics Manager, Supplier 2]. 
 
The Customer‟s decision to plan transport has resulted in the loss of flexibility within Supplier 2‟s 
production. In this case, adaptation to The Customer is not considered to contribute to the overall efficiency. 
The Customer is a big buyer of transport services, which might justify lower prices. However, Supplier 2 buys 
  
transportation for other parts of their operations, and they consider themselves to be good at this. By planning 
deliveries, The Customer is seen to be causing Supplier 2 extra costs in putting restrictions on Supplier 2‟s 
production planning.  
Supplier 1 has the same experiences as Supplier 2, particularly from a period with huge delivery 
problems. They had been close to causing interruptions with the customer‟s production, but each time they 
would send their own vehicles to avoid bottlenecks. The Logistics Manager at Supplier 1 also suggests that 
they rather should buy their transports themselves.  
Costs for extra transport are easy to track. However, the suppliers consider the centralized planning of 
transport as causing more indirect costs as well. The time the products spend on the road going back and forth 
between different suppliers on their way to The Customer could have been used by the suppliers to increase 
production flexibility. This time could for example be used to balance different orders from different 
customers. Further, there is no flexibility and coordination regarding arrival and departure of vehicles. If the 
suppliers are not ready, it is their problem.  
Costs of missed transports should not occur if everything works according to plan. However, that things 
do not work according to plan is not unusual, according to Supplier 1 and Supplier 2. Even The Customer 
causes extra transport costs occasionally, by changing ordered quantity at the last minute. One of the 
parameters that the suppliers could have used to increase flexibility within their operations, to focus on time for 
production at The Customer instead of time for delivery, has not materialized due to The Customer‟s demand 
on planning the transports. For the suppliers the cost of this lost flexibility is difficult to calculate. 
Another example of how The Customer‟s planning reduces flexibility for the suppliers occurs during the 
VMI-project. Supplier 1 has a supplier, which treats the surface of Supplier 1‟s products before delivery to The 
Customer. They used to have five days for this activity, which the Logistics Manager [The Customer] claims 
can be reduced to two days. The Logistics Manager of Supplier 1 admits this but in his opinion there is more to 
it:  
 
“Five days are not good, and that makes our stock appear large. However, if we need it, they can 
reprioritize. Five days are our safety-stock. If we or our suppliers have problems we can manage 
anyway. Our deal with this specific supplier is that they shall be flexible if we need them to be – and 
then they can have these five days. Now tougher demands will make us lose some flexibility.” [Logistics 
Manager, Supplier 1]. 
  
 
This informal arrangement has been appreciated by Supplier 1 for many years, and has helped them 
meet several deliveries to The Customer on time. However, this is not seen within any reports. This „hidden 
stock‟ would become obvious during the WMI-project, with the Supplier 1 losing flexibility at a cost which is 
hard to see and thereby calculate. 
The suppliers see a structural problem behind the examples above: The interorganizational control is 
carried out on The Customer‟s terms. It implies standardization in the interface between The Customer and its 
suppliers, which demands adaptation from the suppliers. It implies less opportunity for efficient operations 
inside the suppliers‟ own plant and consequently less possibility to balance demands from other customers. The 
interviewees from the suppliers are convinced that efficiency in the supply chain would be higher if more 
attention was given to the situation of the suppliers. To The Customer, adjustment to individual suppliers would 
add extra complexity. The case signals a trade-off between standardization to The Customer and flexibility to 
each of the suppliers.  
 
Cost of inefficient deployment of resources 
According to the suppliers, the VMI-project in itself is an example of how the control proposed by The 
Customer causes resources to be deployed in an inefficient way from the perspective of the supply chain. The 
official intention with the VMI-project, according to The Customer, is to improve efficiency within their supply 
chain. The direct consequence is supposed to be improved efficiency between The Customer and first-tier 
suppliers. Indirect consequences are also supposed to be created. With the implementation of VMI, The 
Customer hopes to „educate‟ their suppliers on how to create efficient interfaces between companies. This 
knowledge should later on permeate the supply chain, to the second-tier suppliers and so on. The Customer‟s 
intention is to influence the entire supply chain with the initiative to control interorganizational relationships 
with the first-tier suppliers. 
However, the suppliers perceive the interface with The Customer to be efficient, relative to their 
interface with their own suppliers, the second-tier suppliers. Even if the now suggested VMI-project could 
contribute to making the interface with The Customer more efficient, the suppliers think that improving 
efficiency would have given better pay-off in the next step of the supply chain. Supplier 2‟s Logistics Manager 
says that the VMI-project is the third proposed change project from The Customer that year. She regards this as 
putting high demands on the Supplier 2‟s resources. Supplier 2‟s Logistics Manager manages all logistical 
  
projects, and is also charged with the general responsibility for logistical questions. At The Customer, the 
logistics developer only works with change projects. Therefore, he has more time to allocate to this work. In 
fact, his work description requires The Customer to continuously work with how to change relationships with 
the suppliers – that is what motivates his position. But Supplier 1 and Supplier 2 are small companies and 
cannot justify employing additional staff for change activities. There is an imbalance in the amount of 
development resources The Customer and the suppliers can put in.  
Since the existing staff are preoccupied with the recurring projects from The Customer, they do not find 
the time to work with their own suppliers - although they perceive that the interfaces towards second-tier 
suppliers are much less efficient than towards The Customer. The Logistic Managers of the two suppliers 
consider many of the methods they work with as potentially beneficial to implement in their interface with their 
own suppliers. Now, since they have not done that, the reduction in stock and increase in throughput speed in 
the interface with The Customer is replaced by an increase in their own incoming stock. With the perceived 
low level of skills in production and logistics with many of their own suppliers, they consider it necessary to 
have a high safety stock to compensate. From the supply chain point of view, there has been a reduction in the 
overall value of stock by moving it further back in the supply chain. However, the gains are not as big as they 
appear from looking solely at the interface between Supplier 1/Supplier 2 and The Customer. The suppliers 
think there is much to gain by moving knowledge further back in the chain. To summarize, the projects that 
The Customer initiates are regarded as a valuable source of new knowledge for the suppliers, which could be 
used to develop the relationships with their own suppliers – if they have the time to do so. 
The interesting point here is that the projects to change the interorganizational processes between The 
Customer and their suppliers seem to have an unintended, direct opposite effect on the network. According to 
the Logistics Manager at The Customer, changes are intended to spread throughout the supply chain. 
According to the suppliers, they would have taken the responsibility to work with these changes if they just 
could only find the time between the projects which The Customer enforces upon them. Bureaucratic 
mechanisms might have a cost in misdirecting efforts from a supply chain perspective.  
Further, every new project also places demands on changes to be made in the suppliers‟ internal 
operations. In VMI, the Logistics Manager of Supplier 2 is concerned about their ability to handle the 
information systems required: 
 
“If The Customer is to have us use all these new systems, then we must adjust. We do not have that kind 
  
of competence here; we must improve in this area.” [Logistics Manager, Supplier 2].  
 
Once again, a supplier perceives a problem as being small. To hire new staff or pay for consultants 
would add to the absorption rates so that cost targets would be a problem – overhead costs are to be kept down, 
and at the same time there is a need to upgrade to be able to follow The Customer‟s development. Further, 
Supplier 2‟s geographical location also makes it hard for them to hire competent personnel.  
The suppliers‟ argument about decreased flexibility and ineffective deployment of resources opens a 
possibility to question the overall efficiency in the supply chain. The case study shows that interorganizational 
control may have intra-organizational implications (see Mouritsen et al, 2001; Håkansson & Lind, 2004; Seal et 
al, 1999). However, in the case study of this article, some of the effects are perceived by the dominated supplier 
as mainly restricting efficiency. Carr & Ng (1995) and Dekker (2003) show the potential of interorganizational 
control. This article shows it is important to acknowledge the perspective of a dominated supplier in order to be 
able to discuss efficiency of interorganizational control. The costs reside within the internal operations of the 
dominated supplier and in their interface to other actors, i.e. in the context of the focal supply chain. Therefore, 
it is necessary to consider interorganizational control as a part of a wider network (Ford et al, 1998).  
However, the ambition of the paper is not to show that interorganizational control is inefficient. The 
case study contains no ambition to measure the profit or loss of interorganizational control. The suppliers‟ 
perceptions of costs are instead interesting as evidence on how they partially accept procedures that to them 
appear to be inefficient. In the following, the various reasons for this will be displayed. 
 
Market setting influencing bureaucratic control in interorganizational relationships  
As shown above, the Customer dominates the involved actors. One example of the power within the 
relationships is related to the financial aspects of the VMI-project. The suppliers have no great expectations of 
any financial gains accruing from it, other than coverage of costs. The Customer is seen as having the power to 
claim the major part of any jointly created value. Even if the project is successful, the suppliers expect tough 
negotiations when setting new prices. The Logistics Manager of Supplier 2 explains:  
 
“Then our positive attitude towards new projects and our good delivery precision is of less importance. 
Their demand for low prices is the most important.” [Logistics Manager, Supplier 2]. 
 
  
 Not surprisingly, this also seems to be the intention of The Customer‟s Logistics Manager: 
 
 “It is up to them to take the opportunity or not. With a good implementation, VMI should cut costs 
substantially. Next time we negotiate we will demand cost-reductions. If by then they haven‟t taken the 
opportunity, it is their loss.” [Logistics Manager, The Customer].  
 
But how can then power motivate the suppliers to engage in interorganizational control, as Bachman 
(2001) suggests that it might? Although the suppliers perceive the project as questionable from a financial point 
of view, there is still only little discussion within the suppliers‟ organizations about whether to participate or 
not. Their opinion is that when such an important customer asks for your participation, then it must be 
accepted. The suppliers see no alternative than to let The Customer decide the agenda for the relationship, 
which includes accepting The Customer‟s suggestion for interorganizational control. What there is to gain in 
terms of short term increase in profits from this engagement is not evident. What there is to lose if the suppliers 
do not engage and take every opportunity to maintain the relationship is more evident – the survival of their 
company. The Customer is to be given no reason to question Supplier 1 and Supplier 2 as suppliers. The 
suppliers are convinced that it is positive for them to appear as active and friendly suppliers to The Customer. 
The argument is that the bureaucratic mechanisms, that The Customer suggests should be part of the 
interorganizational relationship, are a way to keep a close relationship with The Customer. To neglect the rules 
could appear to The Customer as if the suppliers are not cooperative and not engaged into creating an efficient 
supply chain. Therefore, the relationship in itself is a motivation to engage in interorganizational control, 
besides the importance attached to being part of an efficient supply chain. This two-sided motive for the 
suppliers to engage in the activities suggested by The Customer will be shown as relevant to how the suppliers 
choose to act within the relationship.  
Trust is not a major concern during negotiations of new contracts between the organizations. The 
suppliers do trust The Customer to honor agreements. However, the prevalence of negative expectations 
suggesting that The Customer will use their power to claim financial gains and to expect obedience, dominate 
expectations of whether the suppliers will make any gains in the coming negotiations. Earlier studies on 
interorganizational control have emphasized trust as a main motivator to accept interorganizational control 
(Dekker, 2003; Carr & Ng, 1995). However, in this case, social coordination appears to be in accordance with 
what is demanded of a market mechanism to function, a norm of reciprocity (Ouchi, 1979). The following 
  
elaborates on how the perceived importance to keep The Customer close, and to avoid giving reasons for The 
Customer to question the relationship partly explains why costs like the ones discussed in the previous section 
may arise.  
Both suppliers have tried to convince The Customer to change their agenda for the interorganizational 
relationship, but with limited success. During their period with delivery problems, Supplier 1 suggested to The 
Customer that they should buy their own transports, since they so often have to fix transportation by themselves 
anyway. The argument is that this could be done cheaper, if planned ahead. However, this has not been met 
with enthusiasm: 
 
“We were pretty tough when things were rough. We talked to their boss a number of times about 
organizing our own transport and also to place one of our employees at their plant, which could give us 
direct information about what was going on. But they did not dare to trust us with that. They did not 
want to give us a special treatment, compared to other suppliers.” [Logistics Manager, Supplier 1].  
 
Supplier 2 has also had problems with getting The Customer to accept changes: 
 
“We calculated that we should save a lot of money on changing type of pallet. We kept on trying to 
convince them for a while, but they did not really want to listen. Sure, it might create some problems to 
them to have another type of pallet from us but at least they could have looked into it.” [Logistics 
Manager, Supplier 2].  
 
Without denying The Customer‟s claim that their internal routines would be affected, the manager 
thinks that for the efficiency of the supply chain, this could be worth analyzing. Representatives from both 
suppliers claim that they have presented good ideas to The Customer without success. If the ideas do not fit into 
the „system‟, according to The Customer, then they are of no use.  
Representatives from Supplier 1 and Supplier 2 admit overlooking matters they foresee as not fitting the 
current operations or altering The Customer‟s agenda – since they would most often not be considered anyway. 
The Customer thereby succeeds in „setting the agenda‟ for the relationship. This agenda reduces information 
from the suppliers to the customer. The suppliers do see the motive to try to change the agenda for The 
Customer. Efficiency in itself is one reason, and The Customer‟s appreciation of good ideas another (as 
  
mentioned earlier, one of the reasons for the suppliers to be chosen for the project is The Customer‟s perception 
of them as having many good ideas). However, the counterforce is the importance of appearing cooperative. To 
drive issues and to try to force The Customer to change their agenda risks being seen as not cooperative and 
spending time on currently irrelevant matters. The VMI-project contained various suggestions the two suppliers 
had brought forward years ago. At that time the ideas were rejected. The suppliers were told then that they 
should perform their task according to contract, and not demand changes. However, now the suggestions are 
seen as relevant to The Customer. The suppliers have already addressed some of the issues raised in them in 
informal ways. One of them concerns information about the exact number or volume of products that are 
needed, an issue elaborated upon in the next section. 
Further, the suppliers consider costs for reduced flexibility in operations and logistics and alternative 
costs for not working with the interface to their own suppliers as difficult to calculate. Both suppliers perceive 
that good cost estimates are one important part to convince The Customer to listen to their suggestion. These 
costs might be an example of Gietzman‟s (1996) discussion about the need to develop the accounting methods 
in order to identify costs of relationships. That the costs perceived by the suppliers are considered hard to 
calculate partly explains why they are not brought to the attention of The Customer. 
Interorganizational control should contribute to enhancing the information flow (Christopher, 1998; 
Chopra & Meidl, 2001). Three interrelated aspects appear as important to why this is not fully realized in this 
case. First, the suppliers fear being perceived as obstinate. Secondly, The Customer does not signal a desire to 
be informed about suggestions that are off their agenda for the interorganizational control. Thirdly, the costs 
that the suppliers perceive are hard to calculate.  
How can it then be understood that The Customer engages in interorganizational control that the 
supplier see as partly inefficient? First, the complexity of the task, attributed to the strong bureaucratic control 
(Vosselman, 2002), The Customer attempts to pursue, should be recognized. It may be unrealistic to grasp the 
full information relevant to the first-tier suppliers‟ internal operations and their interface to second-tier 
suppliers. What The Customer does - focusing on the direct relationship to the first-tier supplier and 
overlooking other aspects - might very well be better than no interorganizational control at all. The suppliers do 
see a need for interorganizational coordination. They also do see The Customer as the natural actor to enforce 
this. The only problem is that they think there is too much control and that their situation is not considered 
enough. 
  
However, there are signs in the case showing that The Customer is satisfied with an agenda for 
interorganizational control that does not consider the perspective of the suppliers in every way. The official 
intention behind their engagement in interorganizational control is to search for overall efficiency. However, 
the following example shows that the Customer is to some extent more interested in their own, internal 
efficiency than the network, or even the interorganizational relationship.  
The first meeting of the VMI-project, the importance of making a calculation about the financial effects, 
was in focus. This was also taken into the project plan. The main argument was that the calculation should be 
used when VMI was implemented by all The Customer‟s suppliers, to show financial gains from engaging in 
VMI. However, during the course of the project, the ambition to make calculations changed within the project 
group. Cost estimates for VMI seemed hard to outline. As soon as an initiative supposedly made to save costs 
in the supply chain was discussed, the representatives from the suppliers wanted to see how it would affect 
them first. These two suppliers had already described highly different expectations of what the changes would 
mean to them. For example, savings in stock area differed, since one of the suppliers was located in an area 
with low costs for storage-room, while the other was located in a more attractive/expensive area. Within the 
project group, there was an opinion that savings in the supply chain would not so much depend on VMI itself – 
but instead on the ability to use the potential of VMI and the present situation of every supplier. The question 
raised in the group was: If possible gains were so tightly connected to each supplier, how then could the pilot 
study produce results with universal application? More than 200 suppliers would have highly diverse situations. 
In the light of these reflections, the question about a calculation of the effects was put aside. The Logistics 
Developer believed that the project nevertheless could contribute with good examples of procedure and show 
the financial potential of VMI:  
 
“I want to carry through this project and gather as much experience as possible before we decide if we 
are going to do this [VMI-implementation] or not.” [Logistics Developer, The Customer].  
 
The question about VMI calculation was back on the table during the last meeting I attended, with only 
people from The Customer showing up. The Logistics Manager, who attended the meeting, was disappointed 
for the lack of a calculation: 
 
  
 “We must have a calculation which we can fairly justify to top management.” [Logistics Manager, The 
Customer].  
 
This was seen as essential to have the Customer accept VMI internally. The problems of measuring the 
effects for the suppliers were considered relevant, on condition that they should not restrict calculations being 
made. The Customer‟s top management was considered to be most interested in internal savings. Internal 
savings were believed to be measurable, and to show strong cost-reductions should be possible since the 
general idea with VMI was to move activities (storing, planning) from The Customer to the suppliers. This 
meeting was dominated by a strong opinion that VMI was necessary to pursue, and the presence of internal 
savings was the factor that persuaded senior management to decide about moving on with VMI. How VMI 
affects suppliers was in this respect a secondary concern.  
The search for cost-information has been mainly proposed by The Customer‟s Logistics Manager, and 
the foremost use is in internal decision-making within The Customer. To gain support for the VMI-project, the 
benefits must be motivated by figures. Financial information thereby appears more important to the internal 
decision process of The Customer than to the project itself.  
This is further explained by the fact that VMI is possibly not dependent on current suppliers to become 
successful, as the Logistics Developer explains:  
 
“What we are discussing at the same time (internally) is the potential of buying from Eastern Europe. 
This could probably result in lower costs. Such a solution would be facilitated by VMI, because if we 
import from the east, then we need premises for final preparation of the products for production.” 
[Logistics Developer, The Customer].  
 
One way to consider the VMI-project is that it should facilitate the use of the market mechanism in the 
future. To suppliers 1 and 2, this could imply an increased risk of losing The Customer in the future (compare 
with Frances & Garnsey (1996), who suggest that interorganizational control could be used to decrease the 
dependence on certain relationships). 
To summarize, the case study shows two main explanations to costs for interorganizational control. 
Firstly, the suppliers do not want to risk their relationship with The Customer by bringing costs to their 
attention (enforced by problems of measuring costs and their opinion about The Customer‟s lack of interest). 
  
Secondly, The Customer may to some extent lack interest in the costs for suppliers. The representatives from 
The Customer, who are involved in the interorganizational relationship, have more problems in getting their 
voice heard within The Customer than in the interorganizational relationship, i.e. the internal political processes 
are considered harder to handle than the dominated suppliers. The Customer‟s representatives in the VMI-
project needed calculable costs, foremost about internal savings, to get approval from senior management. 
Furthermore, to The Customer it is possible to solve problems with current suppliers by changing suppliers, i.e. 
letting market forces decide. The market setting seems to make room for bureaucratic mechanisms. However, 
to the suppliers the bureaucratic mechanisms are more important to preserve the relationship than pursue 
efficiency. This situation gives incentive to restrict information sharing on the part of the dominated actor, and 
partly limits the incentive to search for it on the part of the dominating actor. 
 
Social coordination within interorganizational relationships  
It was earlier concluded that informal, social coordination and specifically the presence of trust were of 
minor importance when motivating the strategic aspects of the interorganizational relationships. However, on 
the operative level social mechanisms seem to be far more active in coordination, as the following examples 
demonstrate. 
The suppliers‟ logistics assistants seem to know people and systems at The Customer fairly well, and 
they receive much information through their contacts - contacts which the suppliers perceive as valuable. These 
contacts are not regulated by contract. An example of this concerns information about „real need‟. There is a 
formal delivery plan, related to demand from The Customer. This delivery plan concerns weekly batches. If the 
suppliers have trouble filling this delivery requirement, they could contact The Customer and ask about the 
exact volume they are really in need of. Additional quantities can be delivered a day or two later. In situations 
of crisis, this is considered a valuable piece of information.  
However, it is not enough to just avoid interrupting the Customer‟s production. As mentioned earlier the 
suppliers are evaluated in terms of delivery precision. Information on delivery precision is based on a formal 
system. The Logistics Assistant of Supplier 2 has her own way of solving this problem:  
 
“If we do not send full delivery, but perhaps just half of it, and they manage anyway, then everything 
should be okay. However, if they do not change their system at the same time, it still looks like we have 
failed. To get them to change the order-size in the system, you have to be extra nice – that is complicated 
  
for them. I feel like I have done my part when we avoid causing a stop in their production, but it is me 
they yell at when the figures do not look okay.” [Logistics Assistant, Supplier 2].  
 
An aspect of the control system is set aside through cooperation between employees in the two 
companies. 
As mentioned earlier, Supplier 1 occasionally had delivery problems. This, however, does not appear to 
have had any real negative effect on relationships at the operative level. Supplier 1‟s Logistics Assistant 
explains: 
 
 “Since we have never stopped their production and since we have sorted out many tough situations, a 
mutual trust has developed. They trust that they get the products in time, and I trust that they will give us 
as much time as possible. We have talked so much, me and the girl up there. We are pretty social, both 
of us. She has spent an awful lot of time keeping a watchful eye on our products.” [Logistics Assistant, 
Supplier 1].  
 
The Logistics Assistant at Supplier 1 has been in the same business for nearly a decade and sees an 
advantage in continuity: 
 
 “I have had contacts with people at The Customer for ten years. I have worked with most of them up 
there. It is not positive when they change people. You develop a relationship with someone - you know 
what people mean when they say something. It depends on people if cooperation between companies 
works. If someone sits up there and refuses to put rules aside now and then, then it is impossible to 
manage sometimes. If there is someone sitting there demanding 400 pieces although it will only be lying 
in stock, no one gains. We have to send a taxi. The only one to gain is the taxi-company. It is important 
who you talk to.” [Logistics Assistant, Supplier 1].  
 
The Logistics Assistant of Supplier 1 has the same problems with the formal evaluation system as the 
Logistics Assistant of Supplier 2 – and the same kind of solution. 
Supplier 1‟s good contact with The Customer has also boosted the flow of information despite the 
absence of formal agreements regulating it. The Logistics Assistant seems proud to talk about this: 
  
 
“They send the rate of production [for production during the next month] specifically to us; we get it 
directly on an excel-sheet. We see if they are going up or down in rate of different products. That is 
certainly something that comes out of the good relationship we have. This is something they do not send 
to all their suppliers after their planning meeting once a month. We just happened to see one of those 
sheets when we were visiting once and asked if we could get that. That is direct information. And it is 
highly sensitive; some of their rates of production are confidential.” [Logistics Assistant, Supplier 1]. 
  
Another example of how informal, social mechanisms are triggered in coordination comes from the 
VMI-project. One of the purposes with the pilot study is to identify possible obstacles when introducing VMI. 
The project-group sees the internal control system of the Customer‟s procurement-function as such a problem. 
At the very first meeting, the project members decided to keep The Customer‟s procurement department 
outside the project for as long as possible. Many of the changes proposed concerned suppliers taking over 
activities, for example storing. When suppliers carry out more of the activities, everybody in the project 
concludes that higher prices would be demanded. However, the procurement department would never accept 
this, since they are evaluated on piece-price basis. The Logistics Manager of Supplier 1 elaborates: 
 
“Much of the problem is that their purchasers are evaluated on price only. Extra functionality is not 
worth anything to them. It is a terrible sub optimization. The procurement department is hard to 
negotiate with when we want to be compensated.” [Logistics Manager, Supplier 1]  
 
Of course this is a normal market-based act – if suppliers could be squeezed they should be. However, 
The Customer‟s Logistics Developer engaged himself in this question during one of the project meetings: 
“Then we of course have the problem with the purchasers. They will never accept higher piece-prices. We must 
handle this in some way.” [Logistics Developer, The Customer]. Supplier 1‟s Logistics Manager replied: “We 
can always change the product identification numbers, and then it does not show in their statistics” [Logistics 
Manager, Supplier 1]. The Customer‟s representatives regarded this as a good suggestion.  
 
In a follow-up interview, Supplier 1‟s Logistics Manager said: 
 
  
“Yes, it might sound strange, but this is what we have done before. We have also checked another 
project, with another business unit in the corporate The Customer belongs to. There they sent separate 
bills for transportation and stocking, when these activities were shifted to a supplier.” [Logistics 
Manager, Supplier 1].  
 
Here The Customer‟s internal control system seems to have a role in the interorganizational 
coordination – a problematic role which must be set aside in some way. The focus on price per product by the 
procurement department in The Customer is perceived to be a restriction on the development of the 
relationship. The persons involved in the VMI-project spend time looking for a solution for how to bypass the 
influence of the procurement department. In the group, there is an ambition to leave The Customer‟s 
procurement department outside the discussions as long as possible. Further, the project group jointly looks for 
ways in which they could bypass the evaluation system of the procurement department. The group‟s task seems 
to be more important to The Customer‟s representatives than to have their own procurement department fully 
informed. 
To summarize, the individuals appear to be accountable for delivering in order to avoid stopping The 
Customer‟s production. To make things work, the employees of the two suppliers rely on their personal 
relationships with The Customer. For information about what The Customer really needs on a day-to-day basis, 
which could not be found within the systems, they call their contacts and talk to them. For more long-term 
information (a month), one of the suppliers is sent an internal, classified planning report from The Customer. 
These are both examples of how information needed for operational task solving is searched for and obtained 
through informal channels (c.f. Jönsson & Grönlund, 1988; Hedberg et al, 1994). One way to understand social 
mechanisms of coordination is to focus on the will of the individual to solve his/her task (Jönsson & Grönlund, 
1988; Hedberg et al, 1994). The project members have all accepted a task to be fulfilled, and their commitment 
is very much apparent in the case study. With this as a basis, a social mechanism springs into operation (Ouchi, 
1979), resulting in joint cooperation between representatives of the two companies. There is an overlapping 
accountability between the task they are given by their respective manager and the individuals they interact 
with within the interorganizational relationship, i.e. intertwined hierarchical and lateral accountability 
(Willmott, 1996). 
Furthermore, the formal system of evaluation also seems to be of significance to the actors. Concerning 
the evaluation of delivery performance, it is important that it does not show negative figures. However, this 
  
could be arranged either through delivering according to the formal system, or by convincing their contacts in 
The Customer to alter the demand for delivery, so that it matches what is actually delivered – this is seen as 
acceptable as long it does not interrupt production. In this way, a reliance on contacts is used to bypass the 
control system. In the case of the performance control for The Customer‟s procurement department, it is 
important that its effects are not allowed to interfere with change processes at the wrong time. This could be 
arranged by mutually agreeing on changing product identification numbers. Concerning the formal report about 
production levels, every day operations could be made easier if this report finds its way to the supplier. This 
might be a delicate issue to decide on formally, since this would require the internal processes within The 
Customer to be bypassed. Therefore, it is being arranged informally instead. 
In order to understand coordination in interorganizational relationships, these examples of socially based 
initiatives to bypass control systems are interesting. In this case study, the bureaucratic mechanisms are 
perceived as putting restrictions on actions which are mutually beneficial to both companies involved. To reach 
the long-term effects within the VMI-project, or to attain efficiency in deliveries, the control systems have to be 
temporarily put out of play, or bypassed.  
The VMI-initiative is seen as a threat to these essential contacts. Many of the informal contacts that the 
suppliers mention as examples of cooperation on the operative level are supposed to be replaced by formal 
information exchange in the VMI-project. Of course, the suppliers‟ representatives see advantages in that they 
would get information via authorized channels they earlier had received through informal contacts. However, 
The Customer‟s plan to slash the number of employees working with goods reception is perceived as a threat to 
the relationships. Supplier 1‟s Logistics Assistant thinks that contacts like these are necessary for all situations 
which are not planned for:  
 
“They must have some left at The Customer, even if they are not as many as today. We have learnt 
through the years that we should always have good relationships with whoever sits there.” [Logistics 
Assistant, Supplier 1].  
 
On a purely technical basis, a part of the information they get today in an informal way could be put into 
systems. However, the experience of the Logistics Assistant is that no system could ever cover all situations 
that are likely to arise. The Logistics Assistant wants to make sure that if he would need informal help from 
The Customer, he should establish good contacts in the first place. From that perspective, the Logistics 
  
Assistant in Supplier 1 prefers formal systems that do not dictate all types of information exchange, so that a 
need to contact The Customer is maintained, revitalizing the relationships. Supplier 1‟s Logistics Assistant has 
experienced promises like the ones made with the VMI-project before – a new system which would take care of 
everything. According to him, it had never worked before, so the question he poses is why it would work this 
time. When a system fails and a problem needs to be solved quickly, personal contacts are needed, particularly 
with people he could rely on. On the contrary, a system that is supposed to improve coordination will be a 
threat to it, if it fails to provide for personal contacts when they are really needed. The hesitation expressed here 
can be compared to the skepticism expressed towards replacing material work with virtual work (Robey et al, 
2003) or a change from ‟hands-on‟ to a „paper‟ version of management control (Mouritsen, 1999). The results 
point at a hesitation in relying solely on systematized, bureaucratically regulated, information sharing. To 
summarize, social mechanisms seem to „fill the holes‟ of bureaucratic mechanisms – sometimes even if it 
means setting the bureaucratic mechanisms aside.  
The employees working in the project also assert that it is important to keep the good spirit in the 
relationship as long as possible. The general market situation, a constant threat to the interorganizational 
relationship, is left out of the discussions within the VMI-project as far as possible. Even if the problems 
relating to piece pricing within the procurement department could be solved, Supplier 2‟s Logistics Manager 
has no doubt that The Customer would take the main part of jointly created values. This is however something 
she kept to herself, particularly something does not discuss with The Customer‟s representatives. Also The 
Customer‟s representatives do not bring up other market-opportunities during the meetings with the suppliers. 
Earlier in the case description, it is mentioned that The Customer sees the VMI-project as enabling a future 
possibility of sourcing in Eastern Europe, which could be a threat to the suppliers involved in the project. 
However, the Logistics Developer [The Customer] does not want that to be discussed within the project 
meetings:  
“However, that is something that we shall not discuss now with our suppliers. We of course do not want 
them to feel threatened when we discuss this project.” [Logistics Developer, The Customer].  
 
Since the dominance of The Customer is so well acknowledged by all those who are part of the project, 
there is no reason to let this situation affect the overall cooperative spirit within the project group. The 
interpretation made of the situation is that market mechanism should not be allowed to interfere with the social 
mechanisms if it can be avoided, i.e. the explicit use of power should be avoided as far as possible. 
  
Interorganizational control in the case can be characterized as heterogeneous, with the market setting 
dominating the strategic level of the organization while the informal, social mechanisms are far more active on 
the operative level. The market setting is influential also on the operative level by making room for the 
bureaucratic mechanisms, which must be handled. However, on the operative level, individuals could act and 
bypass these if they deem it necessary. The strategic aspects, which in the case are represented by deployment 
of development resources within the interorganizational relationship, and the degrees of freedom that the 
suppliers would be allowed, are questions open to influence from The Customer‟s internal control processes. 
The Customer‟s representatives, involved in the daily activities within the interorganizational relationship, do 
not have the possibility to decide on the agenda for interorganizational control. Their flexibility towards the 
suppliers are reduced by the decisions to centrally plan transports and to decrease the level of inventory in the 
exchange process. Thus, The Customer‟s internal decision processes are vital to interorganizational 
relationships.  
An epilogue of the VMI-project demonstrates another example of how the interorganizational 
relationships are dependent on what happens to The Customer. As the project neared its end and members 
sensed that potential for possible success was there, all current external logistic projects within The Customer‟s 
organization came to a halt, including the VMI. The Customer received orders from the manager of the division 
it belonged to about prioritizing change projects regarding internal operations. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The research questions of this article are addressed through a case study of two interorganizational 
relationships in which the market situation enables the dominating customer to resort to power to manage their 
suppliers. The study shows how the market situation provides room for the use of bureaucratic mechanisms and 
how social mechanisms work to complement or bypass these bureaucratic mechanisms if they are considered 
problematic to coordination. Bureaucratic mechanisms can be more important to dominated suppliers as a 
means to preserve a business relationship rather than to enhance efficiency. Bureaucratic mechanisms may 
thereby be accepted although they are considered problematic and potentially costly to dominated organizations 
and supply chains. The study contributes to earlier research in the field by questioning of the hitherto mainly 
positive picture of bureaucratic mechanisms as a support in managing business relationships. The following 
provides a summary of the conclusions of the study. 
The first research question to be explored in this article is how dominated suppliers may interpret 
  
bureaucratic mechanisms in an interorganizational relationship with power as the main force in creating 
expectancies between actors. Mouritsen & Thrane (2006, p. 274) conclude that, “…, management technology is 
integral to developing an inside and an outside in the network”. This conclusion is informative to the present 
study. In a market setting where dominated actors see no alternative than to try to preserve the relationship, 
bureaucratic mechanisms are turned into a possibility for the dominated actor to signal cooperativeness to the 
dominating actor. By accepting control initiatives and engaging in developing new bureaucratic mechanisms, 
dominated actors may avoid disturbing dominating actors in the hope of protecting the relationship.  
In our case study, representatives of the dominated suppliers see this as more important than enhancing 
efficiency in every situation, in contrast to the (official) intentions of the dominating customer. Dominated 
suppliers‟ incentive to accept a bureaucratic mechanism in order to preserve the relationship is one way to 
understand the prevalence of bureaucratic mechanisms that are seen as costly, and a hindrance to efficiency. As 
argued in the theoretical section of this paper, the type of bureaucratic control that a dominating actor often 
pursues is of a highly complicated nature, with high demands on information sharing and information 
processing capability, i.e. operational information from multiple organizations. When a dominated supplier 
restricts information sharing, the task of managing the supply chain is further complicated for the dominating 
customer. Power does enable interorganizational relationships and bureaucratic control, but when it makes the 
relationship and the accounting techniques important in themselves to the dominated actors, a troubling aspect 
is inflicted on the control process.  
This implies an interest in the process of how dominating actors decide on bureaucratic control of 
interorganizational relationships. When dominated actors hesitate to bring up matters that are off the agenda, 
the responsibility will be left to the dominating suppliers. Seal et al (2004) show how a dominating actor may 
have a role in implementing new practices in local contexts. However, due to the decisive role that the 
dominating actor may have, there is a potential risk that implementation of methods that are considered as best 
practices in general terms may dominate local, financially relevant, concerns. The dominating actor‟s ability to 
manage will be decisive to performance and development of the interorganizational relationships. This is in line 
with arguments Carr & Ng (1995) and Dekker (2003) make. However, their interpretation of this situation is 
positive. Due to the potential problems with interorganizational control for dominated suppliers, this positive 
effect of the dominating actors‟ influence may be questioned and should not be taken for granted. According to 
Richardson (1972), a potential benefit with interorganizational coordination resides in the need for dissimilar 
activities to be managed by actors with different capabilities. If dominated suppliers choose not to or are not 
  
allowed to be active in setting the agenda for the management of interorganizational relationships, this potential 
benefit is lost. 
The second research question is how social coordination mechanisms may give flexibility to an 
interorganizational relationship where a dominating customer enforces a strong bureaucratic coordination. 
Bureaucratic mechanisms that are considered problematic to coordination may be handled by informal social 
mechanisms. In addition, dominated suppliers that attach importance to the picture shown of them through 
formal systems may search for and get help to bypass formal systems based on personal contacts. Bureaucratic 
mechanisms can thereby be temporarily put out of play, and be corrected to show the picture that they should, 
by social mechanisms. Examples, from the case, include both bypassing the procurement department and 
adjustment of ordered volumes to equal deliveries.  
However, the study shows that troubling bureaucratic rules can be bypassed by social, informal 
mechanisms but to change an agenda of interorganizational control seems to be harder. The case study shows 
that there is a significant difference between bypassing a rule based on mutual agreement between two (or 
more) individuals, and changing the rules. Large organizations with many suppliers may have good reasons to 
keep standardized interfaces in their ties with suppliers, in order to reduce complexity. To change rules requires 
the dominating actor to either accept adapted interfaces towards specific suppliers or change the standardized 
rules towards all the suppliers. Both these actions would add complexity to the management of the interface 
with suppliers for the dominating actor.  
The study provides support for social mechanisms as necessary to complement rigid, bureaucratic rules 
that should be applied to multiple suppliers with differing preconditions. An important part in understanding 
how this can occur in the case is how the individuals taking part in the relationship choose to leave out the 
market setting when discussing practical issues. The power distribution in the relationships is so clear to 
everyone anyway, why should it then be allowed to destroy the good spirit that can be so helpful in solving 
problems and avoiding bottlenecks? Furthermore, dominated suppliers may see extensive bureaucracy-based 
coordination as a threat. Daily, routinized activities can perhaps be systematized, but it would decrease the need 
for continued contacts between individuals and consequently threaten the personal contacts that are valuable for 
solving situations that deviate from the plan (and such situations occur frequently, at least according to the 
actors in the present case). 
The field of interorganizational control needs further research. The conclusion of this article highlights 
one special area, the processes by which agendas for interorganizational control are developed. Such studies 
  
need to highlight internal processes with dominating customers and how local concerns for dominated suppliers 
may find a place in these processes. The dominating actor‟s central role in the development of 
interorganizational relationship is in the case complicated by internal matters. To develop interorganizational 
relationships intraorganizational support may be needed and it must bypass intraorganizational controls (Seal et 
al, 1999; Håkansson & Lind, 2004). In this work, there is a need to acknowledge that the dominating actor is 
often not homogeneous. Even if those involved in the interorganizational relationship have the best of 
intentions about overall efficiency, their ambition may be overruled by considerations of internal control or 
political agendas within the dominating organization. Bureaucratic mechanisms in interorganizational settings 
are probably here to stay, but a more critical stance may be required.  
The limitations of conclusions from studies like the present one reside in how they can be put into 
action. Single case studies can provide us with experiences to theorize, in order to apply experiences to other 
situations. However, specific social situations (like the ones studied in this article) differ from others, and 
conclusions from studies like this cannot be taken as answers about how other situations should be understood. 
The conclusions are ideas and theories the potential of which is worth considering and exploring further. 
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Figure 1: Outline of business relationships for the involved organizations [in bold] and the employees quoted 
in the paper [in italics] 
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Supplier I 
- Logistics Manager 
- Logistics Assistant 
Supplier II 
- Logistics Manager 
- Logistics Assistant 
 
Internal customers 
30% of Supplier II‟s sales 
50% of Supplier I‟s sales 
2 other customers 
5 other customers 
Approximately 200 other suppliers 
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The Customer 
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   [project leader] 
- Logistics Manager 
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